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Abstract 
This research aimed to analyze the effects of the proportion of independent board, audit committee and audit 
quality on earnings management. Quality audits in this research is proxied in firm size, auditor independence and 
auditor industry specialization. The population used in this research were manufacturing companies listed on The 
Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2012 - 2014. The sampling technique used in this research was purposive 
sampling method and obtained 198 samples of data for 66 companies. This research uses secondary data from 
the annual financial statements obtained from the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2012 - 2014. To test the 
hypoteses in this research used multiple linear regression. The results of this research showed that auditor 
independence has negatively influence to earnings management. The higher independence of auditors who 
audited the company, the lower earnings management that may be carried out by management. The research also 
found evidence that the proportion of independent board, audit committee, firm size and auditor industry 
specialization had not significant effect to earnings management.  
Keywords: Independent board, audit committee, audit quality, earnings management. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The financial report is a record that contains information about the financial condition of a company at a certain 
period. Where the financial statements is a form of accountability for the management company to the owner. 
Indicators show that the performance of a company looks nice one of which can be seen in the income statement. 
The amount of the profit stated in the income statement in addition to providing information about the financial 
condition of a company, can also be used to affect users of financial statements to take a decision about their 
relationship with the company. Profit information is often used by management to conduct opportunistic actions 
by selecting specific accounting policies so that the profits can be arranged, raised or lowered as desired 
management. The financial statements are the object of earnings management practices, as the financial 
statements reflect the company's performance in the short term and long term. According to Scott (2003), 
Earnings management occurs for several reasons, such as to increase the compensation, avoiding debt 
requirements, meet analyst forecasts, and affect the stock price. Earnings management behavior undertaken by 
managers came from the agency conflict is the conflict of interest between principal and agent. There are two 
different interests in companies where each party equally seek to maximize profits.The occurrence of earnings 
management in addition to the management of opportunistic action often occurs because of weak supervision or 
monitoring of companies that allow the agent to commit deviant acts. Earnings management practices can be 
minimized either by better supervision mechanism conducted by independent board. Supervision of the audit 
committee also helps to prevent acts of earnings management by the company. Great Quality audits can detect 
earnings management actions undertaken by the company 
In Case earning management has recently occurred is the company which is an electronics firm Toshiba 
and nuclear energy technology. The financial condition of the company is already distorted and different from 
the findings of an independent audit committee. Corporate profits overstated by $ 1.2 billion over a period of 
five years and it has seen since April 2015 when Toshiba investigate deviant practices in the energy division. 
Any circumstances worsened in May 2015 after an independent audit committee to take over the financial 
evaluation. As a result, Toshiba shares fell 20% since early April when issues related to finances began to smell. 
In One way to minimize the actions that earnings management with the implementation of good corporate 
governance in a company.  
The Government has emphasized the importance of supervision by an independent commissioner in 
achieving good corporate governance. JSX Directors Decree No. Kep-305 / BEJ / 07-2004 on Independent 
Commissioner stated that in the framework of the implementation of good corporate governance (GCG), a 
company listed on the Stock Exchange are required to have independent board that amount comparable to the 
proportion of the number of shares held by non-controlling shareholders provided that the number of 
independent directors at least 30% of the total number of commissioners. Beasley (1996) states that fraud in 
financial statements less the case if the percentage of commissioners who come from outside the company for 
more. This shows that the independence of the board of commissioners can reduce the occurrence of fraud in the 
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company statements kuangan. Independence of the board of directors effective influence on the financial 
reporting process. More and more independent board of directors, the supervisory process will do more quality 
(Nabila and Daljono, 2013). 
Supervision of the audit committee can prevent the occurrence of acts of earnings management in a 
company. Research on the audit committee performed by Mahdy, et al (2012) found that the audit committee has 
an influence on earnings management. Thus the audit committee of a company can influence the management to 
real earnings management activities 
The occurrence of earnings management practices within a company will reduce the confidence of the 
stakeholders, this can be overcome by the application of a good quality audit in a company. Quality audits in this 
study was measured using Auditor Independence, Firm Size and Auditor Industry Specialization. For detecting 
earnings management practices required an independent party, the auditor (Princess and Yuyetta, 2013). The 
auditor's independence is indispensable to ensure the quality of audit reports produced by the auditor. Auditors 
must be able to ensure the execution of his duty to maintain an attitude of independence. If the company is 
audited by the big four accounting firm will reduce earnings management practices, KAP big four has a tendency 
to maintain the quality of the resulting audit in the audit process as this will have an impact on the reputation of 
his company. Auditor Industry Specialization is often associated with earnings management because the auditor 
is believed to be able to detect those errors better, increase efficiency and improve the assessment of the veracity 
of financial statements (Chrisnoventie, 2012). 
 
LITERATURE AND DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS 
The Agency theory is a theory that states the relationship between the agent and the principal where one party 
has more information than the other party (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). This theory assumes that agents have 
more information than the principal for the agent who runs the company's performance related to the authority 
and responsibility given by the principal. While the principal has informasil less about the condition of the 
company. The information imbalance causing asymmetry of information between the principals and agents. 
Information held by the agent the agent can be used to commit fraud to other parties, namely the principal. The 
condition is used by agents to manipulate the financial statements that aim to improve their welfare. 
 
Effect of the Proportion of Independent Board on Earnings Management 
Independent commissioner deemed able to perform monitoring functions in order to create good corporate 
governance. With supervision by an independent commissioner will make managers more cautious and 
transparent in running the company that will lead to good corporate governance. The greater the number of 
commissioners who come from outside the company, the smaller the likelihood of fraud in presenting the 
financial statements by management for control by commissioners better and free from various internal interests 
in the company, Prastiti and Meiranto (2013). Jao and Pagalung (2011) in his study also concluded the same 
results that the greater the composition of independent board, the higher supervision in the company so as to 
minimize the possibility of managers to manage earnings. The existence of the board of directors from outside 
the company that is independent of the pressure and managerial intervention will create transparency in the 
company (Nabila and Daljono, 2013) 
H1: The proportion of independent board negative effect on earnings management 
. 
Effect of Audit Committee on Earnings Management.  
Several studies have shown that audit committees play a role in financial reporting honestly. Prastiti and 
Meiranto (2013) and Tiswiyanti et al (2012) proved that there is a relationship between the size of the audit 
committee with earnings management. Their audit committee is required in an effort to reduce the likelihood of 
earnings management, oversight of the audit committee who uphold the principles of good corporate governance 
practices will prevent the occurrence of earnings management in a company.  
H2: The audit committee has a negative effect on earnings management 
 
Firm Size Effect on Earnings Management 
Nastiti and Gumanti (2011) concluded that large KAP can reduce earnings management practices in companies 
that did IPOs in Indonesia for attempting to maintain market share at the same time the reputation of the audit 
should not be done with the relaxation of audit quality which can lead to earnings management practices. Putri 
and Yuyetta (2013) also found that firm size has a negative effect on earnings management. The larger the size 
of the firm (Big 4), the smaller the profit of the company management. KAP which included the Big-4 is more 
competent than non Big-4 accounting firm, so it has more knowledge about how to detect and manipulate the 
financial statements and earnings management. Therefore, the manager would not dare do the cult of earnings 
management.  
H3 = Size KAP negative effect on earnings management.  
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Effect of Auditor Independence on Earning Management  
Research conducted by the Mahdi Safari et al (2011) showed that the auditor independence negatively affect 
earnings management. That is, the auditor be independent, then the lower earnings management activity 
undertaken by managers. Auditor be independent and the exclusion of economic dependence in reviewing and 
providing an audit opinion that the possibility of fraud in financial reporting can be minimized. Auditor be 
independent to maintain the reputation and trust of the community. Thus, the hypothesis is:  
H4 = auditor's independence negatively effect on earnings management 
 
Effect of Auditor Industry Specialization on Earning Management 
Research conducted Mahdi, et al (2011) showed that the auditor industry specialization negativeeffect on 
earnings management.This means that the auditor industry specialization can minimize profit management action. 
Christiani and Nugrahanti (2014) also concluded the same results that the auditor industry specialization can 
detect earnings management as auditor industry specialization has more knowledge (superior knowledge) about a 
particular industry. The ability of industry specialization encourages clients to not earning management so that 
the quality of earnings increases. Additionally auditor industry specialization can also detect earnings 
management to maintain their reputation as an auditor. 
H5= Specialties Industry Auditor negative effect on earnings management 
 
RESEARCH.METHODS 
Population, Sample and Sampling Techniques The population in this study is a manufacturing company listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) with observation-year period from 2012 to 2014 contained in IDX 2012-
2014. The sampling technique is purposive sampling where the sampling of companies is based on the following 
criteria: 
1. The Issuer is manufaktur company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), which publishes the annual 
financial statements for the period December 31 2012 to 2014. 
2. The data on the variables to be studied available in full in the financial statements. 
3. The Issuer and its annual report includes the financial statements audited by independent auditors. 
4. Issuers should generate positive earnings in its financial statements 
Variables and Measurement Variables used in this research are: 
1. Dependent Variables in this research is the selection of Earnings management is undertaken by managers in 
determining the accounting policy to achieve some particular purpose (Scott, 2003) 
Earnings management in this study using discretionary accruals as a proxy, calculated using the modified 
Jones model because the model is considered to be better among other models to measure earnings 
management (Dechow in Ujiyantho and Scott, 2007). Total accruals are classified into discretionary and non-
discretionary component in phases: 
a. Measuring total accruals using the modified Jones model 
Total accrual (TAC)= Net Income (NI) - Operating Cash Flow (CFO) 
b. Calculating the value of accrual estimated by regression equation OLS (Ordinary Least Square) 
(TACT / At-1) = α1 (1 / At-1) + α2 (∆REVt / At-1) + α3 (PPET / At-1) + e  
Where: 
TAC =Total Accruals company i in period t 
At-1 = Total assets in the first at the end of the year t-1 
∆REVt = Changes in the company's revenue from year i t-1 to year t 
PPET  = Fixed assets (gross property plant and equipment) Companies in period t 
E = Error 
c. By using the above regression coefficients, the value of non-discretionary accruals (NDA) can be 
calculated using the formula: 
NDAt = α1 (1 / At-1) + α2 (∆REVt - ∆RECt / At-1) + α3 (PPET / At-1) 
Where: 
NDAt= non-discretionary accruals for firm i in period t 
∆RECt = changes in receivables i of year t-1 to year t 
d. Further discretionary accrual (DA) can be calculated as follows 
DACt = (TAC / At-1) – NDAt 
Where: 
DAC t = Discretionary Accuals firm i in period to t 
2. Independent variables in this study area. Independent Commissioner Board, 
Independent board are: board members who are not affiliated with the management, board members and 
other controlling shareholders, and free from the influence of business or other influences that can affect the 
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ability to act independently or act solely in the interest of the company (National Committee Governance, 
2006). 
a. The composition of independent directors is measured by comparing the number of independent 
directors with the total number of commissioners (Sun and Liu, 2013). 
b. Audit Committee The audit committee is a party to assist the commissioner in order to improve the 
quality of financial reports as well as increasing the effectiveness of external and internal audit 
(Sulistiyono in Jao and Pagalung, 2011). The audit committee to act independently in carrying out its 
duties and responsibilities  
KA =A T of member of the committee audit  
The number of members of the committee audit according to the rules OJK 
c. Quality Audit 
1. The size of KAP 
One indicator of the quality of the audit is seen from the small size of the firm where the auditor 
works, which are divided into KAP Big-4 and Non Big-4. KAP Big-4 is the expertise and high 
reputation compared with non Big-4 accounting firm (Princess and Yuyetta, 2013). According to 
Kane and Velury (2005) in Luhgiatno (2010), KAP Big-4 can provide greater assurance to 
investors in the integrity of financial reporting because (1) they have a large capacity and a more 
geographically extensive and diverse technical capability to focus on audit assignments, and (2) the 
substantial resources of their legal rights, including the company's reputation, they provide high 
assurance of the integrity of a report. 
KAP is included in a group of Big-4 are: 
1. KAP Purwantono, Sarwoko and Sandjaja affiliated with Ernst and Young (E & Y). 
2. KAP Haryanto Sahari & Co. affiliated with Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC). 
3. Firm Osman Bing Satrio & Co. affiliated with Deloitte Touche Thomatsu (DTT). 
4. KAP Siddharta Siddharta and Widjaja affiliated with Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler 
(KPMG) 
Firm size is measured with a nominal scale through dummy variables, using a scale of 1 to 
represent the companies audited by the Big-4 accounting firm and a scale of 0 to represent 
audited by non-Big-4 accounting firm. 
2. Independence Auditor The independence of the auditor is the auditor whose state is free from 
influence, not controlled by the other party and not dependent on others (Mulyadi, 2002). In this 
study, the independence of auditors was measured with a nominal scale through dummy variables, 
namely (a) scale of 1 used if KAP providing opinions going concern in the current year and the 
client is experiencing financial distress and scale of 0 if otherwise, (b) the scale 1 is used if the firm 
does not give a going concern opinion in the current year and the clients do not experience 
financial distress and scale of 0 if otherwise (Princess and Yuyetta, 2013). 
3. Auditor Industry Specialization 
Industry specialization is measured using the same comparison the number of KAP with the 
overall number of companies in a particular industry. Auditor industry specialists at the KAP has a 
market share of at least 15% in certain industries while non-specialist auditors industry has a 
market share of less than 15% in certain industries Craswell et al. (1995). This classification is 
based on the percentage of the number of companies audited by the auditors in an industry 
(Andrew, 2012). This variable was measured by using a dummy, for auditor industry 
specialization coded 1 whereas non auditor industry specialization coded 0. 
Classic Assumption Testing Before testing the hypothesis, then the data obtained in this study will be tested in 
advance to meet the basic assumptions, and tests performed include:  
(1) Normality Test data is performed using non-parametric Kolmogorov Smirnov,  
(2) Test Heteroskidastity using test scatterplots,  
(3) Test Multicollinearity by looking Tolerance Value and Variance Inflatin Factor (VIF),  
(4) Autocorrelation test with test mennggunakan Durbin Watson Data analysis method 
To test the effect of Proportion of Independent Commissioner Board, Audit Committee and Audit Quality on 
Earnings Management used multiple regression test (multiple regression analysis). The data in this study using 
SPSS 21, with a research model as follows: 
Y = α + β1 + β2 DKI KA + KAP + β2 β2 β2 SIA + IA + e 
Information : 
Y  = Earnings Management 
DKI = Independent Board 
KA = Audit Committee 
KAP = Size 
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IA = Auditor Independence 
SIA =Auditor Indusrty Specialization 
E = Error 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Results of Data Collection Based on purposive sampling method, acquired 66 manufacturing companies that 
meet the specified criteria so that it can be used as a sample in this study. In this study using a 3-year period of 
observation, for observation data mining company gained as much as 66 x 3 years = 198 observation data. 
 
Normality Data 
Data normality test aims to test whether a regression, the dependent variable, independent variable or both have a 
normal distribution or not. To get the normality of the data, it is necessary to detect the absence of data outliers. 
From the test results of normality with non-parametric statistical tests Kolmogorov Smirnov showed that 
significant value is still below 0.05. So this means that residual data is not normally distributed. Data were not 
normally distributed can be transformed in order to be normal (Ghozali, 2013). In this study, researchers tried to 
change the independent and dependent variables into shape Natural logarithm (Ln). From the results of data 
transformation and non-parametric statistical tests Kolmogorov Smirnov has been done, in Table 1 are known 
Kolmogorov Smirnov value of 0.667 and significant at 0.776. It can be concluded the data were normally 
distributed residual and regression models feasible for use in this study. 
Table 1 
 Uji Normalitas withKolmogorov Smirnov 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Unstandardized 
Residual 
N 56 
Normal Parametersa,b 
Mean 0E-7 
Std. Deviation ,87872156 
Most Extreme Differences 
Absolute ,089 
Positive ,089 
Negative -,065 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,667 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,766 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
  Sumber: Data Diolah (2016) 
 
Multicollinearity 
In the regression model is a good should not happen correlation between independent variables, if there is a 
correlation there will be multikolinearitas. A regression model was declared free of multikolinearitas if the 
tolerance value is above 0.10 or variance inflation factors (VIF) under 10 (Ghozali, 2013) 
Results of testing the tolerance values in the table below showed no independent variables that have a 
value tolerance of less than 0.10. The test results variance inflation factor (VIF) also showed similar results that 
no one independent variable which has VIF value of more than 10. The limit of VIF is 10 and the tolerance value 
is 0.1. If the VIF values greater than 10 and the value of tolerance is less than 0.1, there will be multikolinearitas 
and regression models. 
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Table 2 
Multikoloniearitas test 
Sumber: Data Diolah (2016) 
Autokolerasi 
Autocorrelation test aims to test whether a linear regression model was no correlation between bullies error in 
period t with bullies error in period t -1 (previous). If there is a correlation, then there is a problem called 
autocorrelation (Ghozali, 2013). To determine the existence ofautocorrelation can see the value of Durbin 
Watson test. 
The test results autocorrelation in the regression model to meet the criteria, value DW of 2.026, this 
value will be compared with the value of the table by using the value of significance of 5%, the number of 
samples 56 (n) and the number of independent variables 5 (k = 5) (du = 2, 37; 5 - du = 2.63). This means 
regression model above there is no autocorrelation problem representedby the numeral Durbin Watson was in 
between both tables and 5-du tables. 
Tabel 3 
Autokorelasi test 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 ,497a ,247 ,172 ,92161 2,026 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SIA, DKI, IA, KA, KAP 
 
Heterokedatisitas 
Heterokedastisitas test aims to test whether the regression model occurred inequality residual variance from one 
observation to another observation. To detect the presence of heteroscedasticity in a regression model can be 
done through testing Glejser with the following results 
Table 4 
 Heteroskedastisitas test with Glejser test 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 1,121 ,739  1,518 ,135 
DKI -,175 ,803 -,031 -,218 ,828 
KA -,397 ,728 -,080 -,545 ,588 
KAP ,459 ,331 ,350 1,387 ,172 
IA ,034 ,161 ,030 ,208 ,836 
SIA -,570 ,374 -,389 -1,522 ,134 
a. Dependent Variable: AbsUt 
Sumber: Data diolah (2016) 
From the test results heteroskedastisitas above, it can be seen that the significant value of the variable 
proportion of independent board (DKI) of 0.828, the audit committee (AC) of 0.588, the size of KAP (KAP) of 
0.172, the independence of the auditor (IA) of 0.836 and industrial specialties auditor (SIA) of 0.134 is greater 
than the significance level, namely 0.05. Thus it can be stated that the regression model no symptoms 
heteroskedastisitas 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) -2,760 1,230  -2,244 ,029   
DKI -,766 1,337 -,072 -,573 ,569 ,947 1,056 
KA ,613 1,213 ,067 ,506 ,615 ,866 1,155 
KAP ,602 ,551 ,246 1,092 ,280 ,297 3,370 
IA -1,044 ,269 -,503 -3,885 ,000 ,897 1,115 
SIA -,526 ,623 -,193 -,845 ,402 ,290 3,453 
a. Dependent Variable: LnML 
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HypothesisTesting 
Table 5 
T test 
 
Sumber: Data diolah (2016) 
1. Effect of the Proportion of Independent Board on Earning Management 
Hypothesis test results can be seen in Table 5 shows that DKI variable with a value of t = -0.573 and 
significance value of 0.569, which means a significance value greater than 0.05. It can be concluded that 
the proportion of independent board had no effect on earnings management. 
This means that the presence of independent board, fraud in presenting the financial statements by 
management may still be possible. Monitoring carried out by the board of commissioners that is free of any 
internal corporate interests can not guarantee correctness in financial reporting. 
The results of this study are consistent with the hypothesis testing conducted Siregar and Main (2005) 
which states that the proportion of independent board has no effect on earnings management. This contrasts 
with research conducted by Jao and Pagalung (2011) and Prastiti and Meiranto (2013) which states that the 
number of independent board that big can reduce the occurrence of earnings management practices. Effect 
of Audit Committee on Earnings Management. 
2. Hypothesis test results can be seen in Table 5, which shows that the KA variable with a value of t = 0.506 
and a significance value of 0.615, which means a significance value greater than 0.05. It can be concluded 
that audit committees had no effect on earnings management. It is probable that there is a mandatory OJK 
regulation of the goal the company set up an audit committee just to meet sankisi persyaatan so avoid 
punishment. Therefore, the performance of the audit committee are less effective and optimal in developing 
and implementing the regulatory process to minimize earnings management practices.The results of this 
study supported the hypothesis testing conducted Siregar and Main (2005) and Prastiti and Meiranto (2013) 
which states that the existence of audit committee has no effect on earnings management. This is contrary 
to all Tiswiyanti el (2012) which states THAT the audit committee of a company can reduce earnings 
management Size Effect of KAP on Earnings Management. 
3. Hypothesis test results can be seen in Table 5 shows that KAP variable with a value of t = 1.092 and a 
significance value of 0.280, which means a significance value greater than 0.05. So we can conclude that 
firm size has no effect on earnings management. This means that there is no difference between KAP KAP 
Big Four and Non Big 4 in detecting fraud committed by management. Management remains despite profit 
taking management action audited by the Big Four or KAP KAP Non Big 4. With their cases drag audit Big 
Four accounting firm can prove that the current firm size can not be used as a benchmark in minimizing 
profit management action. The results of this study are consistent and reinforce previous research 
conducted by Kono and Yuyetta (2013) and Christiani and Nugrahanti (2014) which states that the auditor 
is not able to affect earnings management because management utilizes accrual accounting system. This 
contrasts with research conducted Mahdi et al (2011), Princess and Yutetta (2013) and Dinuka and 
Zulaikha (2014) which states that the auditor at large KAP will likely restrict earnings management 
practices of clients. Auditor Independence influence on Earnings Management. 
4. Hypothesis test results can be seen in Table 5 shows that the variable IA with a value of t = -3.885 
significance level of 0.000, which means that the significance value less than 0.05. So we can conclude that 
the independence of the auditor effect on earnings management. This means that the auditor be independent 
and the exclusion of economic dependence in reviewing and providing an audit opinion that the possibility 
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of fraud in financial reporting can be minimized. The auditor must be independent to maintain the 
reputation and trust of the community. This study supports the results of research Mahdi, et al (2011) which 
states that the auditor independence effect on earnings management. This research study conducted 
contrary to the Princess and Yuyetta (2013) which states that not all auditors to be honest in your opinions 
and examine the financial statements. Auditor Industry Specialization influence on Earnings Management. 
5. Hypothesis test results can be seen in Table 5 shows that the variable SIA with a value of t = -0.845 and 
significance value of 0.402, which means a significance value greater than 0.05. So we can conclude that 
the auditor industry specialization has no effect on earnings management. This means that the membership 
of the auditor to audit clients in the same industry can not be used as a control in reducing their profit 
management action. There may be industry specialist auditor is not to reduce earnings management actions, 
but rather to enhance the credibility of the company's financial statements only to be more trusted by the 
people. This study is consistent with research conducted by Kono and Yuyetta (2013) which states that law 
enforcement in Indonesia is still weak so as to make the auditor is less able to develop the ability to detect 
earnings management practices. This is contrary to Christiani and Nugrahanti (2014) which states that the 
industrial specialties auditor has a better understanding of the characteristics of the industry, better 
adherence to auditing standards, understand the risks and problems in the industry to be audited, have the 
ability to detect errors better than non specialist industry so that industry specialization can better reduce 
earnings management than non accrual auditor industry specialization. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The proportion of independent board had no effect on earnings management. This means that the presence 
of independent board, fraud in presenting the financial statements by management may still be possible. 
Monitoring carried out by the board of commissioners that is free of any internal corporate interests can not 
guarantee correctness in financial reporting. 
2. The audit committee has no effect on earnings management. This means that the existence of audit 
committee can not reduce the likelihood of earnings management. It is probable that there is a mandatory 
OJK regulation of the goal the company set up an audit committee to meet persyaatan just so avoid punitive 
sanctions. Therefore, the performance of the audit committee are less effective and optimal in developing 
and implementing the regulatory process to minimize earnings management practices. 
3. Size KAP has no effect on earnings management. This means that there is no difference between KAP KAP 
Big Four and Non Big 4 in detecting fraud committed by management. 
4. Auditor independence effect on earnings management. This means that the auditor be independent and the 
exclusion of economic dependence in reviewing and providing an audit opinion that the possibility of fraud 
in financial reporting can be minimized. The auditor must be independent to maintain the reputation and 
trust of the community. 
5. Auditor industry specialization has no effect on earnings management This means that the membership of 
the auditor to audit clients in the same industry can not be used as a control in reducing their profit 
management action. There may be industry specialist auditor is not to reduce earnings management actions, 
but rather to enhance the credibility of the company's financial statements only to be more trusted by the 
people. 
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